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In The Second-Person Standpoint, I argue that there is a
distinctive reason for acting-a second-personal reason-that is
conceptually implicated in many central moral notions: moral
responsibility, moral obligation, rights, respect for and the dignity of
persons, and the concept of moral agent or person itself.' What is
distinctive about second-personal reasons is that they are analytically
related to claims and demands that an addresser has the authority to
make of, and address to, the agent second-personally. Reasons of
this kind always involve an accountability relation between addresser
and addressee-that is, that the addressee is answerable to the
addresser in some way, if not for compliance, then at least to give
consideration or something similar.
Although the claims I argue for in my book concern morality-
moral obligation, responsibility, rights, and so on-they would also
seem to bear on the law.2 One way of viewing my project, in fact, is
that it tries to bring out the distinctive character of that part of
morality that is modeled on the idea of law. Moral obligations, I
argue, are not just what there are good (or even compelling) moral
reasons for us to do; they are what members of the moral community
have the authority to demand that we do, what we are accountable to
one another and ourselves for doing. This is why, like Kant, we
naturally speak of the "moral law" in such cases
Similarly, moral rights must also be understood in legal or
juridical terms. What a person has a moral claim right to is what she
* John Dewey Distinguished University Professor of Philosophy, University of Michigan.
1. STEPHEN L. DARWALL, THE SECOND-PERSON STANDPOINT: MORALITY, RESPECT, AND
ACCOUNTABILITY (2006) [hereinafter DARWALL, STANDPOINT].
2. For a more systematic development of this idea, see Robin Bradley Kar, Hart's Response
to Exclusive Legal Positivism, 95 GEORGETOWN L.J. 393 (2007).
3. See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 7-14 (Mary
Gregor ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1997) (1785).
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has standing as an individual to demand that others provide her,
along with authority to hold them accountable. What she has a
moral liberty right to do is what others have no authority to demand
that she not do.' Moral rights thus also involve the moral law. If I
have a moral liberty to do A, then I do no wrong in doing A; that is, I
do nothing that members of the moral community have, as such, the
authority to demand I not do. I do not violate the moral law, under-
stood as what members can demand of one another. And if I have a
moral claim, as an individual, to your doing A, then the moral law
gives me special standing as an individual to demand that you do A
and to hold you accountable if you do not. For example, I could
demand that you compensate my injury, release you from
compensation, or, even, forgive you for injuring me. This is a
standing I have, not as a representative of the moral community
authorized to hold one another responsible for moral wrongs in
general, but as an individual involved in the transaction.
The authority that is involved in moral obligations and rights is
moral authority-as I see it, the authority of members of the moral
community to make claims and demands of other members of the
community. But the notions of authority, obligations, rights, and
responsibility are also all obviously central to law (that is, to laws
legislated, administered, and enforced by those with legal authority).
Laws create legal obligations and rights, and the authority to hold
responsible is essential both to the criminal and the civil law. Laws
are not simply standards that assess conduct in some specific way;
laws are promulgated, that is addressed, to those who are subject to
them. They make putatively authoritative demands with which
addressed subjects are responsible for complying.
Legal sanctions are not just coercive threats, even justified ones.
They involve an exercise of putatively legitimate authority that
purports to give reasons for compliance that cannot be reduced to the
desire to avoid some evil in which the sanction consists, or even to
avoid a justified evil. As Hart famously put it, laws purport to
obligate rather than only oblige.' However unwelcome or restrictive
sanctions may be, there is a fundamental conceptual difference
4. See John Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, 77 J. PHIL. 515, 516-19
(1980).
5. See DARWALL, STANDPOINT, supra note 1, at 18-20.
6. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 6-8 (2d ed. 1994).
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between putting someone on notice of a legitimate sanction as a way
of holding him responsible for complying with law, and either
coercion or, as Raz has pointed out, even justified coercion.7 The
exercise of authority invariably involves "an appeal for compliance"
and "an invocation of the duty to obey."8 We respect law not in the
same way a fighter might respect his opponent's left jab; we
recognize its authority.
As I see it, the reasons that the law purports to provide are
second-personal reasons. I cannot defend this proposal in detail here,
but in what follows I nonetheless want to suggest some reasons in its
favor and for thinking that the notions of second-personal address
and of what I call second-personal authority and second-personal
competence can be useful in understanding the nature of law and
legal obligation. First, however, let me say something about the
notions of second-personal reason, authority, and responsibility or
accountability that I will be employing in my analysis and that I
explore at greater length in The Second-Person Standpoint.9
I. SECOND-PERSONAL REASONS
An example can easily illustrate the intuitive idea of second-
personal reasons. Suppose someone has stepped on your foot.
Compare, to begin with, two different ways in which you might try
to give him reason to get off.
The first would simply be to get him to see that you are in pain
and to feel sympathy for you in your plight, that is, to want you to be
free of pain. In desiring this, he would see your being in pain as a
bad thing, as a state of the world that there is some reason to change.
He would most naturally see his desire not as the source of the
reason, but as a kind of access to an agent-neutral reason for
removing his foot that is there anyway.1 ° The reason would not be
7. JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 25-26 (1986) [hereinafter RAz, MORALITY].
8. Id. at 25-26.
9. See supra note 1.
10. On this point, see E.J. BOND, REASON AND VALUE (1983), JONATHAN DANCY,
PRACTICAL REALITY (2000), STEPHEN DARWALL, IMPARTIAL REASON (1983), JEAN HAMPTON,
THE AUTHORITY OF REASON (1998); T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER 41-55
(1998), Philip Pettit & Michael Smith, Backgrounding Desire, 99 PHIL. REV. 565 (1990), and
Warren Quinn, Putting Rationality in Its Place, in MORALITY AND ACTION 228, 228-55 (Warren
Quinn ed., 1991).
Agent-neutral reasons contrast with agent-relative reasons, those whose formulation
includes an ineliminable reference to the agent for whom they are reasons (like "that it will keep a
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essentially for him as the agent causing another person pain. It
would apparently exist for anyone who is in a position to effect the
state of relief of your pain, and therefore for him, since he is well
placed to do so. Moreover, in "giving" him the reason in this way,
you might not need to address or relate to him in any way at all.
Anything that would get him to see your being in pain as a bad thing,
like an unaddressed grimace or whimper, might serve. In no sense,
not even epistemic, need he be taking any reason to move his foot on
your authority.
A second way of giving someone a reason to move his foot from
on top of yours would be to lay a claim or address a purportedly
valid demand. You might demand this as the person whose foot he is
stepping on, thereby claiming and exercising what you take to be a
right against him. Or you might demand it as a representative of the
moral community, whose members understand themselves as holding
one another to a (moral) demand not to step on each other's feet. Or
you might do both simultaneously. Whichever, the reason you
would address would be agent-relative rather than agent-neutral. It
would concern, most fundamentally, your addressee's relations to
others, viewed from a perspective within those relations. In this
case, that his keeping his foot on yours causes another person pain,
cause inconvenience, and so on, and that this is something we can
and do reasonably demand that people not do. The reason would not
be addressed to him as someone who is simply in a position to alter a
bad state, whether of someone's being in pain or even of someone's
causing another pain.
promise I made," "that it will avoid harm to others, i.e., people other than me," and so on).
Agent-neutral reasons can be stated without such a reference: "that it would prevent some pain
from occurring to someone (or some being)." On the distinction between agent-relative (also
called "subjective" or "agent-centered") and agent-neutral (also called "objective") reasons,
principles, values, etc., see THOMAS NAGEL, THE POSSIBILITY OF ALTRUISM (1970), THOMAS
NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE (1986), DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 54, 55
(1984), SAMUEL SCHEFFLER, THE REJECTION OF CONSEQUENTIALISM (1982), Stephen Darwall,
Agent-Centered Restrictions From the Inside Out, 50 PHIL. STUD. 291 (1986), and David
McNaughton & Piers Rawlings, Agent-Relativity and the Doing-Happening Distinction, 63 PHIL.
STUD. 167 (1991).
Note that philosophers sometimes use "agent-relative reasons" to refer to those that have
their source in the agent's own values or preferences. Although such reasons would also be
agent-relative in the "positional" sense I have in mind in this article, not all reasons that are agent-
relative in the "positional" sense would be agent-relative in this other sense. That an act would
fulfill a promise I made is an agent-relative reason in our current (positional) sense, although it
certainly would not depend in any way on the agent's preference or values.
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Someone can sensibly accept this second reason for moving his
foot only if he also accepts your authority to demand this of him
(second-personally). That is just what it is to accept something as a
valid claim or demand. And if he accepts that you can demand that
he move his foot, he must also accept that you will have grounds for
complaint or some other form of accountability-seeking response if
he does not. Unlike the first reason, this latter is second-personal in
the sense that although the first is conceptually independent of forms
of second-personal address involved in making claims and holding
people responsible, the second is not. A second-personal reason is
thus one whose validity depends upon presupposed authority and
accountability relations between persons and, therefore, on the
possibility of the reason's being addressed person-to-person within
these relations. Reasons of this kind simply would not exist but for
their role in second-personal address and in mediating our relatings
to one another. Their second-personal character explains their agent-
relativity. As second-personal reasons always derive most funda-
mentally from agents' relations to one another, they are invariably
agent-relative at the most fundamental level.
Nevertheless, a norm or reason can be agent-relative without
being second-personal; in other words, there might be a reason of yet
a third kind, which is agent-relative but not yet second-personal. We
can imagine someone who accepts and scrupulously observes a
universal norm of foot-avoidance but who also denies, consistently
with that, anyone's authority to claim or demand his compliance with
this norm, hence denies that he is responsible to anyone for
compliance, even to God. Such a person might conceive of the norm
as mandatory in the sense of entailing categorical, indeed supremely
authoritative, or "silencing," or even "preemptive" or "exclusionary"
reasons, without accepting that he is accountable to anyone for
complying with it.1 He might treat the fact that an action would
involve stepping on another's foot as the weightiest possible reason
not to do it, while simultaneously denying any responsibility to
anyone for such forbearance. However, he could not, consistently
11. A reason "silences" other reasons if it cancels their weight and thus does not simply
outweigh them. John McDowell, Virtue and Reason, 62 MONIST 331, 331-50 (1979), reprinted
in JOHN MCDOWELL, MIND, VALUE, AND REALITY (2d ed. 2001). A reason is "exclusionary" or
"pre-emptive" if it is not to be added to other reasons but to replace or "exclude" them. JOSEPH
RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 35-48 (1975); see also RAZ, MORALITY supra note 7, at
46.
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with this latter rejection, accept that anyone has a right to his foot-
avoidance. In respecting the norm of avoiding people's feet, he
would not be respecting them as persons, since he would not be
recognizing any authority anyone might claim as a person to demand
anything, and in particular that he avoid their feet. 2 Neither, in my
view, could he consistently accept that he is morally obligated not to
step on others' feet since moral obligation is conceptually related to
moral responsibility. I argue that it is conceptually impossible for
someone to be morally obligated to do something but not responsible
for doing it, neither to the moral community, nor to God, nor to
anyone. So someone who thought he was accountable to no one
could not think he was morally obligated not to step on others' feet,
whatever priority he might give to a norm requiring him not to do so.
There is thus a significant difference between the idea of an
authoritative claim or demand, on the one hand, and that of an
authoritative or valid norm or normative reason, or even of a
normative requirement, on the other. There can be requirements on
us that no one has any standing to require of us. For example, we are
under a requirement of reason not to believe propositions that
contradict the logical consequences of known premises, but it is only
in certain contexts, say, when you and I are trying to work out what
to believe together, that we have any standing to demand that one
another reason logically. Even here that authority apparently derives
from a moral or quasi-moral aspect, namely, our having undertaken a
common goal.13 Requirements of logical reasoning are, in this way,
fundamentally different from moral requirements. I follow Mill and
a number of contemporary writers in arguing that it is part of the
very idea of moral obligation that moral requirements are what those
to whom we are morally responsible have the authority to demand
that we do. 4 Clearly this is no part whatsoever of the concept of a
demand of logic or a requirement of reason. 5
12. See JOEL FEINBERG, The Nature and Value of Rights, in RIGHTS, JUSTICE, AND THE
BOUNDS OF LIBERTY 143 (1980); Stephen L. Darwall, Respect and the Second-Person
Standpoint, 78 PROC. & ADDRESSES AM. PHIL. ASS'N, Nov. 2004, at 43.
13. Of course, these further constraints are frequently in the background, as they are, for
example, whenever we do philosophy, say, right now. Because of the relationship you and I are
currently in, each of us does have authority to call one another to account for logical errors, a
standing that, without some such context, we would lack. But regardless of how frequently some
relevantly similar context obtains, the authority comes, not just from the requirement of reason,
but from some other presupposed feature of the context.
14. John Stuart Mill states:
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II. A CIRCLE OF IRREDUCIBLY SECOND-PERSONAL CONCEPTS
The notion of a second-personal reason is therefore one of a set
of irreducibly second-person concepts that can be defined in terms of
one another as follows:
" Practical authority: Someone has practical authority
with respect to another if, and only if, the latter has a
second-personal reason to comply with the former's
valid claims and demands and is responsible to the
former for so doing.
* Responsibility to: Someone is responsible to another if,
and only if, the latter has the authority to make some
valid claim or demand of the former that the former is
thereby given a second-personal reason to comply
with. 16
* Valid claim or demand: A valid claim or demand is
one that is within the authority of someone having
practical authority with respect to another to make of
the latter and that the latter thereby has a second-
personal reason to comply with and some
responsibility to the former for so doing. 7
We do not call anything wrong, unless we mean to imply that a person ought to be
punished in some way or other for doing it; if not by law, by the opinion of his fellow
creatures; if not by opinion, by the reproaches of his own conscience. This seems the
real turning point of the distinction between morality and simple expediency. It is a
part of the notion of Duty in every one of its forms, that a person may rightfully be
compelled to fulfill it. Duty is a thing which may be exacted from a person, as one
exacts a debt.
JOHN STUART MILL, Utilitarianism, in 43 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 445, 468
(Robert Maynard Hutchins ed., 19th prtg. 1971). John Skorupski points out that calling an act
"morally wrong ... amounts to blaming the agent" and maintains that the idea of moral wrong
cannot be understood independently of that of blameworthiness. JOHN SKORUPSKI, ETHICAL
EXPLORATIONS 29, 142 (1999). Allan Gibbard quite explicitly follows Mill's lead in proposing
that "what a person does is morally wrong if and only if it is rational for him to feel guilty for
having done it, and for others to be angry at him for having done it." ALLAN GIBBARD, WISE
CHOICES, APT FEELINGS 42 (1990). We can find versions of this Millian idea in other writers
also. See, e.g., RICHARD BRANDT, A THEORY OF THE GOOD AND THE RIGHT (1979) (discussing
whether we are "morally free" to do something that is "merely wrong" if there is no affirmative
obligation to refrain from doing it); RUSS SHAFER-LANDAU, MORAL REALISM: A DEFENCE
(2003) (arguing that there are "objectively correct answers to many moral questions" such that
wrong-doers are acting "contrary to good reason"); Kurt Baier, Moral Obligation, 3 AM. PHIL. Q.
210, 210-26 (1966).
15. I am indebted to Peter Graham for this point.
16. See DARWALL, STANDPOINT, supra note 1, at 11-12.
17. Id.
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0 Second-personal reason: A second-personal reason is
one consisting in, or deriving from, some valid claim
or demand of someone having practical authority with
respect to the agent and with which the agent is thereby
accountable for complying. 8
As I have indicated, I argue in my book that the concepts of
moral responsibility, moral obligations, rights, respect for and the
dignity of persons, and the concept of person or moral agent all
involve these irreducibly second-personal notions. 9 In my view, this
is a fact of the first importance for moral theory. It means that no
premises that do not involve these second-personal notions can entail
any conclusion that does. It follows that substantive theses about
moral obligation or right cannot be convincingly supported from
premises about how it would be desirable for the world to be. This
does not rule out utilitarian or consequentialist moral theories, to be
sure, but it does mean that for them to be adequately supported, they
will have to be advanced within a second-personal framework, that
is, from within a set of assumptions about our authority to make
claims and demands of one another at all.2°
III. LAW AND LEGAL AUTHORITY
I turn now to ways in which the framework of second-personal
ideas I have been sketching might be helpful in illuminating the
character of law. To begin with, note that nothing I have said about
the four interconnected, irreducibly second-personal notions just
discussed ties them exclusively to morality. As I see it, the root idea
here is of second-personal normative reasons, which reasons always
presuppose authoritative claims and demands, hence authority, along
with accountability. 2' As I analyze them, second-personal reasons
are grounded in genuine, that is de jure, authority of any kind.22
Moral obligations derive from the equal authority of members of the
moral community to hold one another morally responsible;
18. Id. at 5-11.
19. Id. passim.
20. I actually think that preference-satisfaction versions of utilitarianism are best thought of
in terms of equal claims, since being regulated by another's will when this conflicts with his
welfare is a form of respect.
21. DARWALL, STANDPOINT, supra note 1, at 74-79.
22. Id. at 80-82.
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obligations within, say, a military chain of command, derive from the
authority to issue orders of various kind.23 So also, I propose, do
legal obligations and responsibilities derive from legal authority.
Now I do not want to take any stand on fundamental issues of
jurisprudence that divide legal positivists and their critics, at least
those in the mainstream. Whether the existence of law depends on
anything ethical or genuinely normative, and how law relates to
morality, can remain in dispute even if all parties agree that there is a
conceptual difference between law and straightforward coercion or
the "gunman writ large." At the very least, both sides can accept that
the law presents itself as having a kind of authority, whether it
actually has it or not. As we might alternatively put the point, in
order for law to exist there must be some authority defacto. And in
order for defacto authority to exist, at least some people, maybe just
public officials, must be seen to treat some practices or institutions as
having authority de jure (and maybe, as Hart held, must actually so
treat them by taking an "internal point of view"). 4
The very same is true of morality, actually. Even skeptics like
Hume's "sensible knave" or Hobbes's "fool" can question whether
morality creates genuine normative reasons while agreeing that it
purports to do so. 2' They can accept my analysis of moral obligation
and distinguish between the putative existence of second-personal
reasons and whether such normative reasons exist in fact. They can,
if they like, use "moral obligation" and "moral reason" to refer to the
former, that is, to the putative normative reasons that they deny are
normative reasons in fact. If they do, they can agree that morality
creates "moral obligations" and "moral reasons" for action, but deny
that these are genuinely obligating or genuine normative reasons. In
so doing, they would deny that the putative authority that morality
claims is authority de jure. (They may even deny that this is such a
thing as de jure authority.) My suggestion is that the same is true of
legal authority and the law. The law presents its demands as issuing
from genuine, that is, dejure authority, but this may not be so in fact.
23. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
24. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 55-57 (1961).
25. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 90-91 (Edwin Curley ed., Hackett Publ'g Co., Inc.
1994) (1651); DAVID HUME, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, in ENQUIRIES
CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING AND CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS, 169,
283 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., P.H. Nidditch rev., Clarendon Press 3d ed. 1975) (1777).
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I take it, then, that the concept of law requires that of legal
authority, that is, not just authority that is created by law, as when a
law is passed that gives some body the authority to issue a permit to
ride bicycles within the city limits, but also the authority to make or
find law itself, that is, to make it the case that citizens have legal
obligations, responsibilities, and reasons at all that they otherwise
would not have had. If this is so, the concept of law would seem to
be a second-personal concept, that is, one that can only be defined
within the set of interdefinable irreducibly second-personal concepts
that I outlined in the last section.
There is, then, a truistic or tautological sense in which the
concept of law is a second-personal concept. By definition, laws
derive from legal authority and create legal obligations,
responsibilities, and reasons to comply, that is, "legal obligations"
and "legal reasons" for acting in a sense analogous to that in which
even a moral skeptic can accept that there are "moral obligations"
and "moral reasons." Second-personal legal reasons exist in this
sense, whether or not such reasons are genuinely normative and
whether or not the authority that law and legal authority purport to
have is de jure. This much is tautologous or nearly so. Whether or
not the relevant reasons, obligations, responsibilities, and authority
are genuinely normative or dejure or not, it should be clear that they
have a facially second-personal structure. The concept of legal
obligation, for example, seems analytically to entail those of legal
responsibility, authority, and reasons. What one is legally obligated
to do is what one has a legal responsibility to do, what one has a
legal reason to do, and what legal authority requires or demands that
one do. And similarly with the other interdefinable legal concepts.
Legal reasons of the appropriate kind are just those that are
associated with legal obligations and responsibilities, that is, with
what is demanded of us by legal authority.
Thus, legal concepts are at least superficially second-personal.
Whether or not the law creates genuinely normative second-personal
reasons, obligations, and responsibilities, the putative reasons and
obligations are nonetheless second-personal in their structure. They
are situated within a framework of putative authority and
accountability relations. They purport not simply to favor action, or
even to provide compelling or conclusive reasons for it, but to give
distinctive reasons that derive from authoritative demands, hence
THE SECOND-PERSON STANDPOINT
bear conceptually on what we can legitimately be held responsible
for doing. This points to a second way in which law may be second-
personal, namely, that the putative second-personal reasons and
obligations may actually exist. The reasons that the law purports to
create are genuine second-personal reasons-normative reasons for
acting that derive from some genuine, that is, de jure authority to
make demands and hold responsible.
Now, if the argument of The Second-Person Standpoint is
correct, the only way any such authority can be established is within
the second-person perspective. But how can any such authority
claim be justified? I argue that one thing that distinguishes second-
personal reasons from other reasons for acting of other kinds is that
the validity of second-personal reasons depends upon its being the
case that the person to whom they apply can be expected to accept
the reasons and the authority from which they derive by exercising
the capacities in virtue of which the reasons apply to him. 6 The root
ideas are: first, that second-personal reasons always presuppose an
accountability relation; second, that certain capacities (second-
personal competence, as I call it) are necessary to intelligibly be able
to be held responsible at all; and third, that when we hold someone
responsible for doing something for some reason, we are committed
to thinking that the person is capable of holding himself responsible
by recognizing and acting on the relevant reason (along with the
requisite authority) through exercising the relevant capacities.27
Compare the difference in what you must presuppose about
someone to believe that there are, say, reasons of prudence for her to
do something, or even to give prudential advice to her, on the one
hand, and what you must assume to hold someone responsible for
complying with some putatively authoritative demand, on the other.
You may sensibly think that it would be for my own good for me to
take my medications, say, and therefore that there is a prudential
reason for me to do so, without supposing anything about my having
any ability to accept and act on this reason. Even in giving me ad-
vice to act for this reason, you do not have to think that this is
something I must be able to be brought to see the wisdom of for
myself. You might just say, "Trust me, this really is a good reason to
26. DARWALL, STANDPOINT, supra note 1, at 70-90.
27. Id. at 70.
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do this and you should do it." After all, whether the reason exists just
depends on whether it would be for my good to so act, not on
whether I can be brought to see this. If, however, you address a
putatively authoritative demand to someone to get off your foot and
hold one answerable for doing so, by contrast, you do assume that
this is something he should be able to see for himself, or at least to
appreciate when it is pointed out to him, right? After all, how can
you hold him responsible for doing something for reasons he cannot
himself appreciate even when they are pointed out to him? To
intelligibly hold someone else responsible at all, it seems, you have
to suppose that he is capable of holding himself responsible, that is,
that he can comply with the demand by recognizing the authority to
make it and that he is therefore responsible for compliance.
If this is right, then second-personal reasons must satisfy a
"reasonable acceptance" condition. Unlike other reasons for acting,
their very existence is staked on being the case that those to whom
these second-personal reasons apply can reasonably be expected to
be valid by accepting the authority from which they derive. But
what authority can we reasonably expect people to accept? In my
book, I argue that when someone takes a second-person standpoint
toward someone else and makes claims and demands of her of any
kind, he is committed to the presupposition that both the he and his
addressee share a common second-personal authority to make claims
and demands of one another by virtue of their capacity to enter into
relations of mutual accountability (that is, their second-personal
competence).2"
It follows from what we have said already that the addressee of a
second-personal reason must be assumed to have the authority to
hold himself responsible through making the relevant demand of
himself. This is not a trivial thing. Holding someone responsible for
doing something requires trusting and respecting her by giving her
authority to answer for her conduct, including to herself as well. Of
course, this may involve the application of a sanction. But a sanction
through which we hold someone responsible is not just a cost, and
the second-personal authority and reasons that it takes to justify
sanctions in the right way, that is, as a way of holding responsible,
differs from reasons of other kinds that might be sufficient to warrant
28. Id. at 74-79.
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imposing costs.29 To be a reason of the right kind, a consideration
must be something the sanctioned agent could reasonably be
expected to accept as making the sanction legitimate. In other
words, that consideration must be consistent with the respective
authorities of addresser and addressee and hence, fully respecting the
addressee's authority also.
The point can be made with an example drawn from The
Second-Person Standpoint. If a sergeant orders a private to do ten
pushups, she addresses a reason to him that presupposes her
authority to give the order and the private's obligation to obey it. So
far, she may assume only to have to presuppose a superior authority,
that as a sergeant she has the standing to give orders to the private,
whereas the private has no standing to give orders to the sergeant.
But an order does not simply point to a reason holding in normative
space; it purports to address itself second-personally and thereby to
hold the addressee responsible for compliance. As a second-personal
address, an order presupposes that its addressee can freely determine
himself through accepting the reasons it addresses and the authority
in which they are grounded and hold himself responsible for
complying with it. Any second-personal address whatsoever calls
for reciprocal recognition of the authority it presupposes (in this case
the sergeant's authority). It attempts to direct an addressee's will
through the addressee's own free acceptance of that authority.
In assuming that the private is responsible for complying with
the order, the sergeant is committed to thinking that the private
would rightly be blamed if he failed to comply without adequate
excuse. But attitudes, like blame, address demands from a
perspective they presuppose their addressee can share." Their
content is not just "I blame you," but "You are to blame (as you
should be able to see yourself)." So although the sergeant assumes
she has a distinctive authority to hold the private accountable, which
goes with her special authority to issue the order in the first place,
any such specially authorized standing must ultimately be grounded
in an authority she must assume that the private shares with her (to
hold himself accountable). Otherwise, threatening a sanction, even
29. This, I take it, is an important lesson of Strawson's Freedom and Resentment. P.F.
Strawson, Freedom and Resentment, in STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF THOUGHT AND ACTION
71 (1968).
30. See id. at 74-84.
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one he could not complain about, would give him a reason of the
wrong kind to comply. The reason would not be a second-personal
reason to do the pushups whether or not he could escape the
sanction, one the acceptance of which is part of holding himself
responsible.
In making a claim on the private in this way, consequently, the
sergeant must presuppose a distinction between making a legitimate
claim on the private's will in a way that respects his authority as free
and rational, on the one hand. And on the other, attempting to
illegitimately direct his will by simply imposing her will on him by
coercion. However hierarchical, therefore, any address of a second-
personal reason also implicitly presupposes a common second-
personal authority as free and rational."
Suppose, for instance, that the sergeant believes that if the
private disobeys, she will then be entitled to put him in detention.
Seeing what she regards as signs of incipient disobedience, she
reminds the private of this fact; she puts him on notice of a sanction
that she would be authorized to apply in holding him responsible. In
so doing, she necessarily presupposes a distinction between a
legitimately authorized notice of this sanction, which she must
suppose to be consistent with the addressee's freely determining
himself by the second-personal reasons provided by her order, on the
one hand, and attempting to unjustifiably determine him to do the
same act by the mere threat of the very same unwanted alternative in
which the sanction consists, that is, without the relevant authority, on
the other. To use Hart's helpful terms, the sergeant must presuppose
a distinction between obligating the private by an order and obliging
him illegitimately by coercion.32 She must assume that although the
private is subject to her orders, it would nonetheless be a violation of
his normative standing to attempt to direct his will by threatening the
very same evil if she lacked the requisite authority (and other things
were held equal). This commits her to presupposing his authority as
a rational agent with second-person competence.
The upshot, I believe, is that any de jure authority must be able
to be justified to those over whom this authority is claimed in a way
31. See DARWALL, STANDPOINT, supra note 1, at 22 (summarizing JOHANN GOTTLIEB
FICHTE, FOUNDATIONS OF NATURAL RIGHT 49 (Frederick Neuhouser ed., Michael Bauer trans.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 2000) (1796)).
32. HART, supra note 33, at 6-8.
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that is consistent with the equal second-personal authority of all
persons-second-personally competent rational agents. I argue that
this basic proposition can provide a grounding of the right kind for
contractualist moral theory of the sort advanced by Scanlon33 and
suggested by Rawls.34 I conjecture that the proposition can also
ground similar approaches to justifying political and legal authority.
De jure authority of these kinds is also irreducibly second-personal
and must consequently be capable of being justified to those subject
to it in ways that are consistent with their (equal) second-personal
authority. Let me turn now to ways in which the criminal and civil
law more specifically illustrate this claim.
IV. CRIMINAL LAW AND SECOND-PERSONAL REASONS
Broadly speaking, criminal law is that part of the law where
legal punishment is appropriate. But how should we conceive of
punishment? It is a familiar idea that punishment essentially
involves holding someone responsible for something done based on a
finding of culpability and guilt. A legal system, of course, may
articulate these latter ideas in formal ways with specific standards.
But that does not change the fact that the underlying ideas have the
same basic (second-personal) shape as those connected to moral
obligation, namely, moral responsibility, culpability, and guilt. The
moral emotion of guilt is the feeling that one has failed to respect
some moral demand, that one is rightly blamed and held responsible;
indeed, feeling guilty is itself part of holding oneself responsible.35
And guilt's natural expressions are also second-personal-
acknowledgment of fault, apology, making amends, and so on.
Through their expressions, one makes oneself answerable to the
other, thereby acknowledging his authority to hold one responsible
and, therefore, to make claims and demands of one in the first
place.36
Although apology is most appropriately to the victim, and he has
a distinctive authority to determine whether or not to forgive the
injury to him, guilt is not the feeling that he alone has a justifiable
33. SCANLON, supra note 15.
34. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 95-96 (2d ed. 1999) ("rightness as fairness").
35. DARWALL, STANDPOINT, supra note 1, at 71.
36. Id. at 71-72.
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complaint. One does not blame oneself as if from the victim's
standpoint. One sees oneself as being to blame, that is, that blame is
appropriate from a common perspective that violator and victim
share as members of the moral community. In other words, one feels
that punishment and not just compensation is warranted.37 And in so
feeling, one acknowledges, and thereby respects, the authority of the
moral community to hold one responsible.
As I see it, viewing legal punishment in terms of responsibility
also can give us a more adequate conception than typical retributivist
or consequentialist approaches. The problem with purely
consequentialist accounts of punishment put simply in terms of the
desirability of deterrence or defense is the same one Strawson
identified with consequentialist approaches to moral responsibility:
they do not provide a reason of "the right sort" for practices of moral
responsibility "as we understand them."3 That we have reason to
desire to be able to hold people responsible for something, is one
thing, whereas our having reasons of the right kind that warrant our
legitimately doing so-that give us the authority to do so-is
another. The only reasons that can justify relating toward someone
in some way as an instance of holding him responsible are second-
personal reasons; facts concerning the desirability of likely outcomes
of the action are, taken by themselves, simply reasons of the wrong
kind. (This does not mean, however, that consequences cannot
figure within second-personal reasons.)
But consequentialist approaches are not the only ones that fail to
honor Strawson's point. That some response to a wrong might make
for a more fitting whole does not itself establish any authority so to
respond. If punishment is, in its nature, holding someone responsible
for violations of law, then the right kind of justification for it must be
one that can establish its legitimacy; the reasons must be ones the
punished can reasonably be expected to expect himself. Violations
of law are, at bottom, failures of respect, most obviously of legal
authority, but also of the de jure authority (as I see it, residing in the
37. Compare, in this regard, Locke's distinction between the right of compensation that
victims of injustice have in the state of nature, and the right of punishment, which is held by
everyone. See JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 269-72 (Peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690).
38. See Strawson, supra note 29, at 74 (emphasis added).
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community of second-personally competent persons) that all legal
authority purports to have.
Punishment can be justified in the right way, therefore, only by
being called for by the underlying mutual respect that mutual
accountability itself involves. If and when it is justified by
considerations that are rooted in equal second-personal authority,
punishment respectfully expresses a demand for respect. Adam
Smith writes that when we resent injuries, what our "resentment is
chiefly intent upon, is not so much to make our enemy feel pain in
his turn, as .. . to make him sensible, that the person whom he
injured did not deserve to be treated in that manner."39 Properly
justified, therefore, a specific form of punishment is called for as a
warranted way of holding someone responsible. By accepting
punishment, someone thereby recognizes the authority to be held
responsible and to make the relevant demand in the first place, and
thereby takes responsibility oneself.
To view punishment in this way is to see it as justifiable in
fundamentally second-personal terms. It follows that if the
appropriateness of punishment is distinctive of the criminal law, then
the latter is best viewed in fundamentally second-personal terms also.
V. CIVIL LAW AND SECOND-PERSONAL REASONS
Aspects of the civil law seem to have a fundamentally second-
personal character as well (in addition to the general second-personal
grounding that, if I am right, any genuine de jure authority has, and
therefore, any putative authority must purport to have). Take, for
example, the law of torts. Torts are violations of duties to
individuals or, equivalently, rights they hold against one. They
involve injuries of various kinds that we have duties to others not to
visit on them, whether intentionally or through negligence. Of
course, these same actions may be proscribed by the criminal law
also, but whereas what is at issue in criminal punishment is, as we
have just seen, a form of holding responsible that is carried out by
duly constituted legal authorities (in the name of the moral
community from whom they inherit their authority), what is involved
in torts is compensation, that is, something the victim has a
39. ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 129 (Pat Maloney ed., Barnes &
Noble Publ'g 2004) (1759).
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distinctive right to claim. It is, of course, central to the idea of a
society under the rule of law that victims do not have standing to
make, or at least attempt to insist on, such claims personally. They
must do so through the appropriate legal channels-the courts.
Nonetheless, the law gives expression to their distinctive authority to
claim such compensation as the right holder. The very idea of torts
involves the standing individuals have to decide whether to make or
waive claims to compensation.
We can find an appreciation of this point in Thomas Reid. "A
favour naturally produces gratitude," Reid writes, and "an injury
done to ourselves produces resentment; and even when done to
another, it produces indignation."4  Favors are just treatment that
goes beyond what we owe to, and have the authority to expect from,
one another.' And injuries are in their nature treatment (or its
imputable consequences) that fails to reach that level. 2 It is one
thing to see ourselves as benefited or harmed by others, even
intentionally, and another to regard another's act as a favor or injury.
The latter only makes sense in relation to warranted expectations that
Reid collects under the concept of justice. What justice requires and
allows, as he puts it, "fills up the middle between these two."43
If this is right, then the ideas of compensation and tort are
themselves irreducibly second-personal. They essentially involve
what a distinctive authority we have as individuals to expect from
others, and to claim from them should those expectations be violated
(and as well, to waive such claims). In my view, this helps explain
why, as Gideon Yaffe persuasively argues, appeals to a standard of
the "reasonable person" are often appropriate in law, for example, in
defining a standard of negligence or in standards of self-defense.4 I
argue, in fact, that the concept of the reasonable, as opposed to the
rational, is itself a second-personal concept.45 Reasonableness, in the
relevant sense, contrasts with rationality both in the sense of
40. THOMAS REID, ESSAYS ON THE ACTIVE POWERS OF THE HUMAN MIND 410 (M.I.T.
Press 1969) (1788).
41. DARWALL, STANDPOINT, supra note 1, at 193.
42. Id.
43. REID, supra note 40, at 410.
44. See Gideon Yaffe, Reasonableness in the Law and Second-Personal Address, 40 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 939, 958-66 (2007).
45. DARWALL, STANDPOINT, supra note 1, at 304-20.
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conforming to formal standards of practical reason, such as
means/end rationality or the formal principles of the theory rational
choice and in the more substantive omnibus sense of according with
practical reasons generally.46 Someone is reasonable when they give
due weight to others' legitimate demands and respect their authority
as equal persons-that is, in Rawls's terms, as equally "self-
originating source[s] of valid claims."47 Standards of negligence and
due care are thus to be understood in terms of what we can
reasonably demand of people in light of their and others' equal
authority to make claims and demands of one another, and similarly
for self-defense. What risk I may reasonably impose on others in my
own defense must be assessed in terms of our equal authority to
make claims and demands of one another.
VI. CONCLUSION
These remarks about the criminal and civil law and about the
putative authority of law in general have been necessarily sketchy. I
hope, however, that they have at least indicated some ways in which
the framework of ideas that I present in The Second-Person
Standpoint might be helpful in accounting for a number of
phenomena concerning the law, including legal authority, obligation,
responsibility, and, perhaps, the nature of law itself. With this
possibility in view, I look forward to the contributions to this
volume.
46. Id. at 315-20.
47. See Rawls, supra note 4, at 546.
Spring 2007]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:891
